

April 9, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : A Concept of the Anatomy of a Task Force
in the CIA Operations Center

1. As the designated host of a CIA or community-wide Task Force, the CIA Operations Center sees its responsibility as both supportive and participatory. The mechanics of its supportive role are spelled out at Annex; its participatory role is more conceptual and is outlined below.

2. Whether CIA only or community-wide, the Task Force would be headed by a designated representative of the DCI--usually but not necessarily the NIO--who would serve as a link between DCI/WSAG deliberations and the Task Force supervisor and the head of the Operations Center. Responsibilities would be divided between the Task Force Supervisor and the Operations Center as follows:

A) Task Force Supervisor: Designated by the DDI, this officer would normally be a senior analyst from the Office of Current Intelligence, and would head a group of analysts drawn from OCI, OSR, OER, plus whatever augmentation is dictated by circumstances. The Task Force Supervisor would oversee the production of Situation Reports.

B) Chief, CIA Operations Center: His role would be to insure, in consultation with the appropriate NIO and the Task Force Supervisor, that full participation plus all elements of necessary support are available for the length of time the task force is resident in the Center. This would include:

(1) The timely provision of all pertinent and available intelligence information received by the Agency, including that received through the DDO/Duty Office or the DDS&T/Duty Office.

(2) Assignment of at least one Senior Watch Officer for full-time liaison with analysts assigned to the task force to facilitate all aspects of the Center's production support.

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(3) Insure in consultation with OGCR, in the event they are not represented on the task force, that all appropriate graphics are available in a timely way.

(4) In consultation with the Chief DDO/DO and the Chief, DDS&T/DO and the Task Force Supervisor of the Task Force, determine whether full time DDO and DDS&T analytical participation is required.

(5) In consultation with appropriate parties in the DDS&T, particularly the Chief, OEL, make those arrangements necessary which will provide the task force with a potential interactive capability between the information it receives and that which could be enhanced by use of the collection assets at the disposal of the Office of ELINT, either directly or through NSA.

(6) Maintaining liaison on information flow and interactive matters, with the various Operations Centers of the Intelligence Community, i.e., State, NSA, both NSOC and DEFSMAC, NMCC, NMIC, NOSIC and others as appropriate, CGAS, FBIS, etc.

4. In brief, the NIO representing the Director would act as the funnel through which directions, new requirements and policy level guidance would pass to the Task Force Supervisor and the Chief of the Operations Center. This three pronged arrangement is essential if the Director is to make the best use of the human and other resources at his disposal during crisis times. This concept is equally applicable to an all CIA Task Force or a National one consisting of representatives from other agencies and charged with producing a community coordinated situation report.


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Orig & 1 - DDI
1 - D/DCI/NIO
1 - AD/OCI
1 - CD/MEA/OCI
1 - C/IC/PAID
1 - A/DDA

Annex: Task Force Facilities

There are no major physical impediments to accommodating an inter-agency task force in the CIA Headquarters. Facilities to do so exist in the sixth floor area of the Operations Center.

Representatives seconded to us from other agencies can be housed and supported there along with Agency participants, with due regard for the compartmentation of DDO and DDS&T traffic. The Directorate of Operations input will be funneled via the duty officers on the seventh floor with the possible addition of liaison to the division. The DDS&T contingent is located on the sixth floor contiguous to the Task Force area but separated from it. The physical facilities for supporting an inter-Agency task force exist; communications links comprise the only significant restraint. CONTEXT terminals are operational at CIA and NSA; a third has been installed at State. There is none at Defense Intelligence Agency.

A CONTEXT terminal was delivered to the Department of State on April 7, the Office of Communications having laid the data line and communications link twenty-four hours earlier. Because of its location in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, [REDACTED] DIA's terminal will not be delivered until June 20. There will be a dedicated secure voice link operating off CONTEXT linking CIA, NSA, State and DIA effective April 30. Its EOD might well be accelerated.

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
Lacking CONTEXT, there would be a requirement for the vetting or exchange of drafts by use of the WASHFAX net (a process that could be time consuming and disrupt the regular production cycle and delay coordination of NID and NIB items) or OPSCOM circuitry.

We have asked the Office of Communications to explore the feasibility of the latter arrangement.

Alternatively, we could drop a speaker box off the White House Switch and use the National Operations and Indications Watch Officers Net (NOIWON) for conferencing.

This would be preferable to employing the KY-3, which suffers a degradation when more than four conversants are hooked together in a conference mode. NOIWON is used daily throughout the community and its utilization this way would not require any familiarization or encounter cultural resistance.

Coincidentally, two of the production shops that would be involved in a Mid-East Task Force utilize pilot SAFE terminals in their daily production. The Operations Center task force area already has one SAFE terminal. We can access via a second terminal in the DDS&T duty office so that both the strategic and political analysts can enter their files and scan incoming traffic.



The Operations Center is prepared to provide watch officer and clerical support 'round the clock to any task force--supplying the full flow of narrative traffic received in the Agency and providing access to outgoing communications channels as necessary.

Experience has taught us that the actual presence of representatives of other USIB agencies is essential to the coordination of production, as is the writing at least of first drafts. Tasking other agencies to prepare paragraphs or sections of situation reports leads to intolerable delay. This means that people sent here by State, DIA, NSA, etc., must be of sufficient stature to be able to vote their principals' stock. If they're competent enough to participate in the production process in some way other than a coordination role, so much the better.